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Abstract
This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver
with evidence that is generated via public or private experimentation. Under
public experimentation any experimental outcome is revealed and under private
experimentation the sender may hide adverse outcomes. The sender can design
the properties of the experiments. The receiver chooses whether to verify at a
cost the design of the experiment with which the revealed outcome was generated.
The paper finds that communication breaks down under public experimentation
if there is no restriction on the experiment’s design and that persuasion is possible
under private experimentation.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates a situation where a sender (e.g., a prosecutor, a student or an
interested party) tries to persuade a receiver (e.g., a judge, a teacher or a politician) to
take an action (e.g., the conviction of a defendant, a better mark, a policy). For the
receiver, the optimal action is in the sender’s favour in one state and it is against the
sender in another state. There is a threshold belief above which the receiver will take
the sender’s preferred action. Her prior belief is below the threshold.
Evidence (or an argument) used for persuasion usually has an inherent meaning.
In this paper evidence consists of a recommendation and reasoning supporting the rec-
ommendation. As an illustration suppose a sender provides evidence (or argues) “This
is the right decision, because ...”.1 The recommendation “This is the right decision”
is straightforward. The reasoning following the “because”on the other hand may be
involved and require effort to understand. The receiver may not pay attention to the
sender’s reasoning. It can be tedious for the receiver to grasp its meaning, as for ex-
ample reading a paper or listening to a presentation. The receiver may just follow the
recommendation and think about something more pleasant instead of trying to under-
stand the reasoning.2 The sender may try to exploit the receiver’s incentive to ignore
the reasoning. Instead of searching for hard to find favorable high quality evidence, he
may search for easy to find favorable superficial reasoning that does not have suffi cient
persuasive power to convince a receiver who pays attention.
The evidence used for persuasion in this paper stems from experimentation. An
experimental outcome correctly predicts the decision-relevant state of the world with
1Straightforward recommendations followed by some sort of reasoning are common in practice.
Recent examples are the persuasion attempts of the remain campaign (“Vote for remain, because ...”)
and the leave campaign (“Vote for leave, because ...”) in the Brexit debate. Other examples are “I am
innocent, because ...”, “TTIP is good, because ...”etc.
2Not paying attention matters in practice. A drastic example is jurors falling asleep during a
trial. King (1996) finds that sixty nine percent of 562 judges who returned her survey reported cases
(during the last three years) where jurors had fallen asleep. Another example is Wolfgang Schäuble,
the German Minister of Finance, playing Sudoku in the Bundestag during a debate on financial aid
worth billions of Euros for Greece (Darnstädt, 2012). In the context of the recent presidential election
in the U.S. I also suspect that many voters did not pay attention to the winner’s arguments during
the electoral campaign.
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endogenous error probabilities. The sender designs the error probabilities of each exper-
iment that he runs. The outcome of an experiment is interpreted as a recommendation
for a decision. The experiment’s design determines the quality of the information that
the experiment generates. The design of the experiment, i.e., the probabilities with
which it correctly predicts the states of the world, is viewed as the reasoning. The
evidence of an experiment, hence, consists of the outcome of this experiment and the
experiment’s design. If the sender uses an experiment’s outcome for persuasion in his
message to the receiver, then the receiver directly observes the revealed outcome. The
receiver then chooses whether to verify the message. If she verifies the message, then she
learns the design of the experiment with which the presented outcome was generated.3
Verifying the message is costly, whereas no verification is costless.
The paper distinguishes between public and private experimentation. Experimen-
tation is public if, starting from a situation without information, the sender designs
one single experiment and then discloses its outcome to the receiver. For example, a
trial can be viewed as a public experiment where a prosecutor tries to persuade a jury
to convict a defendant. The prosecutor can, e.g., influence the error probabilities by
choosing the structure of the examination of witnesses. Jurors not paying attention,
e.g., by falling asleep (as documented in King, 1996), do not learn these error proba-
bilities. In contrast, experimentation is private if the sender may secretly run multiple
experiments and selectively reveal an outcome. The sender’s decision whether to run
a further experiment with a design of his choice is contingent on the experimentation
history. For example, thought experiments that yield logical arguments are run sequen-
tially in private and the results can be revealed selectively (Felgenhauer and Schulte,
2014). The sender can influence the experiments’quality by choosing the conceptual
framework from which specific assumptions are drawn. The receiver under private ex-
perimentation does not directly observe the experimentation history even if she verifies
the message, as the sender may privately have collected additional evidence. Verifica-
3E.g., by thoroughly reading a paper or by carefully listening to a presentation, the receiver can
assess the quality of the presented argument.
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tion of the sender’s message under private experimentation can be viewed as learning
the face value of the sender’s recommendation.
The paper finds that persuasion is impossible under public experimentation and
costly endogenous verification, if the design of the experiments is flexible. This re-
sult is in contrast to the findings in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Gentzkow
and Kamenica (2014), in the following KG and GK, respectively. Both papers analyze
persuasion under public experimentation with complete design flexibility, but without
costly endogenous verification. Public experimentation in their papers differs to the
present paper in that there the receiver costlessly observes the design of the experi-
ment that the sender runs, whereas here she only observes the design if she pays the
verification costs. KG study the best experimental design from a sender’s perspective
with which he can persuade a receiver, where each experimental design is costless. By
being able to freely design the public experiment the sender has substantial influence
in the decision making in the sense that his preferred decision is chosen more often
than justified by ex ante probabilities. GK show that KG’s findings are robust to a
broad class of cost functions where experimentation costs depend on the design of the
experiment. KG’s and GK’s results also hold if there is costly exogenous verification (if
the receiver has to ask the sender for advice) or costless endogenous verification. The
current paper shows that their results are not robust if verification is both “costly”and
“endogenous” in a parsimonious version of their models with costly experimentation,
even if verification costs are arbitrarily small but positive.4 In this case the design
flexibility is the cause of the communication breakdown and it harms the sender.
The communication breakdown under public experimentation in the current paper
is due to two commitment problems.5 First, the receiver cannot commit to ignore in-
formation that she learns: if her belief is pushed above the threshold to choose the
sender’s preferred action, it is sequentially rational to take that action. Second, the
4The size of verification costs depends on the type of argument and the expertise of the receiver.
An example where verification costs are likely to be very high is where a climate scientist provides a
comprehensive study in order to warn a politician about climate change. Park (2017) models such a
situation as a cheap talk game.
5I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this intuition.
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sender cannot commit to designing an experiment which is suffi ciently valuable for the
receiver to justify the verification cost.6 If the sender anticipates that the receiver
verifies the message, then the sender’s best experiment renders the receiver indifferent
between both actions if she takes the sender’s preferred action and it renders her cer-
tain that the state is bad when she chooses against the sender. Such an experiment
maximizes the persuasion probability. However, this experiment has no value for the
receiver: without it, she would choose against the sender; with it, either she is indif-
ferent to take the sender’s preferred action, or she chooses against the sender. Thus,
the receiver does not have an incentive to pay the cost to learn the experiment’s design
in the first place. As the receiver cannot commit to punishing the sender for designing
a low quality experiment, the sender cannot commit to design an experiment that is
suffi ciently valuable for the receiver to justify the verification costs. Key for the commu-
nication breakdown under public experimentation is the flexibility of the experiment’s
design. If exogenous restrictions force the sender to choose among highly informative
experiments, then persuasion becomes possible.7
Persuasion is possible if experimentation occurs in private given that experimenta-
tion and verification costs are suffi ciently low. With private experimentation the design
flexibility can be reduced endogenously. For example, if the sender chooses an unex-
pected (off-the-equilibrium path) design for persuasion, then the receiver who verifies
the message may believe that the sender privately collected additional high quality ev-
idence with adverse outcomes that are not revealed. Given these beliefs the receiver’s
sequentially rational action upon observing an unexpected design is against the sender.
The sequentially rational punishment given such beliefs can force the sender to choose
a high quality design that makes it worthwhile for the receiver to pay the verification
6For persuasion to occur in equilibrium it is necessary that the receiver (sometimes) verifies the
sender’s message. Suppose the opposite. The sender’s best response to no verification is to run
an uninformative experiment that always yields a favorable outcome. By equilibrium reasoning the
receiver anticipates this behavior and, therefore, a favorable outcome does not push her belief above
the threshold.
7In practice procedural rules in public trials that specify what arguments can be presented in court
or what type of questions are admissible that a prosecutor may ask exogenously reduce the degrees of
freedom regarding the design of public experiments. A continuous adjustment of the flexibility may
also not be possible by the nature of the evidence generation process.
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costs. There is no pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion, but there can be mixed
strategy equilibria. The paper derives the sender-preferred equilibrium. This equi-
librium has a simple structure. The sender first runs an informative experiment. If
it’s outcome is positive, then it is used for persuasion. Otherwise, the sender mixes
between stopping experimentation unsuccessfully and running an uninformative exper-
iment that always yields a positive outcome. The receiver mixes between verification
of a positive outcome and no verification. In the former case she is only persuaded if
the positive outcome stems from the informative experiment. In the latter case she is
only persuaded by positive outcomes.
The different results under public and private experimentation are due to off-the-
equilibrium path beliefs. If the receiver observes an off-the-equilibrium path design
under private experimentation, then it is not obvious whether she has access to all
the information that is available, as the sender may have run additional experiments
without revealing the outcomes. This allows off-the-equilibrium path beliefs that make
a punishment for using a low quality design sequentially rational and can force the
sender to choose a high quality design. Under public experimentation, in contrast, such
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs are not possible. If the receiver pays the verification
costs, then she has access to all the information that is available, which determines her
beliefs and she cannot commit to choose against what she thinks is best. If the receiver
verifies a favorable outcome, then the sender exploits the lack of credible punishment
by choosing a design that just persuades her.
Finally, the paper shows that in any equilibrium with persuasion under private
experimentation the sender designs informative and uninformative experiments. The
former yield hard decision-relevant evidence. The latter yield outcomes that do not
have an inherent meaning. Messages without an inherent meaning are, therefore, not
entirely crowded out by valuable hard evidence if the receiver may choose not to listen.
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2 Literature
There is an extensive literature on persuasion (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982, Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986, Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001, 2004, 2006). Many papers assume that
the sender is exogenously endowed with private decision-relevant hard information. If
arguments are viewed as decision-relevant evidence, as in the present paper, then it
is natural that they have to be acquired in the first place (as, e.g., in Celik, 2003,
Brocas and Carillo, 2007, and Henry, 2009). In this branch of the literature, persuasion
via experimentation with a flexible design of the experiments has received a growing
attention. As arguments play a role in many decision environments and the properties
of arguments can be influenced, it is relevant to understand how the design flexibility
affects decision making. The papers with these features that are most closely related
are KG, GK and Felgenhauer and Loerke (2016).
Felgenhauer and Loerke (2016), in the following FL, analyze sequential private ex-
perimentation with a flexible design of the experiments.8 Arguments are typically
acquired in private and, hence, private experimentation may be viewed as more natural
than public experimentation. The modelling approach here is similar to FL, but the
current model considers endogenous verification. Their paper also derives the sender-
preferred equilibrium. In this equilibrium the sender runs only one experiment. Here,
the sender starts with the same experiment as in FL and stops successfully if the out-
come is positive. If the outcome of the first experiment is adverse on the other hand,
then the sender mixes between running an uninformative experiment and stopping un-
successfully.
The current paper shows that under private experimentation the sender sends mes-
sages containing outcomes from informative and uninformative experiments with a posi-
tive probability in any equilibrium with persuasion. An outcome from an uninformative
experiment does not have an inherent meaning and the sender can design an uninforma-
tive experiment such that it yields any outcome. Upon verifying a message stemming
8Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) study sequential private experimentation with an exogenous pre-
cision of the experiments.
7
from an uninformative experiment the receiver learns that it does not have an inher-
ent meaning. The model could be reformulated such that the sender can either run
informative experiments (with selective outcome revelation) or send a costly cheap talk
statement that does not stem from experimentation.9 The strategic effects are the same.
Under private experimentation in such a model the sender sends messages containing
outcomes from informative experiments and cheap talk with a positive probability in
any equilibrium with persuasion. In this sense the paper is related to the cheap talk
literature (e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982) where messages do not have an inherent
meaning, but they obtain their meaning through equilibrium behavior. Kartik (2009),
Eső and Galambos (2013) and Dzuida (2012) combine features of the persuasion and
the cheap talk literature, but without endogenous evidence production.
Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) study communication as a moral hazard problem in
a team with endogenous verification. The sender is endowed with evidence that may or
may not be strongly in his favor. The probability that the receiver correctly observes
the sender’s evidence depends on the receiver’s costly message elaboration effort and
the sender’s costly persuasion effort.10 Persuasion is in principle possible. Endogenous
verification is similar to the current model, but the present paper has a different focus.
It studies whether persuasion is possible under private and public experimentation given
that the design of the experiments is flexible.
3 Assumptions
3.1 Preferences
There is a state of the world ω ∈ Ω, with Ω = {ω1, ω2}. Ex ante both states are equally
likely. The receiver chooses action a ∈ A, with A = {a1, a2}, and obtains gross utility
9Upon verifying the message, the receiver in such a model again learns whether it has an inherent
meaning.
10Similarly, in Perez-Richet and Prady (2012), who study complexity in persuasion, the receiver’s
learning costs are influenced by the sender’s choice of the complexity level.
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ω = ω1 ω = ω2
a = a1 1 1− pd
a = a2 pd 1
with pd ∈ (12 , 1). The receiver’s optimal action is a = a1 if and only if her posterior
that the state is ω = ω1 is weakly above her “threshold of doubt”pd. As ex ante both
states are equally likely, she chooses a = a2 if she does not have access to additional
information.
The sender prefers action a = a1 in each state. His gross utility is 1 if a = a1 and
it is 0 if a = a2.
Experimentation and verification costs have to be subtracted from the respective
gross utilities.
3.2 Experimentation
The sender may run experiments that generate signals about ω. An experiment τ
yields outcome στ ∈ {s1, s2}. Outcome s1 is called a “positive outcome” and s2 an
“adverse outcome”. The design of an experiment τ is πτ = (πτ (s1 | ω1), πτ (s2 | ω2)),
with πτ (sj | ωj) = prob{στ = sj | ω = ωj}, πτ (sj | ωj) ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}. Let
πτ (s1 | ω1) ≥ 1 − πτ (s2 | ω2), i.e., a positive outcome στ = s1 occurs with a higher
probability if ω = ω1 than if ω = ω2. Denote by (στ , πτ ) the “evidence”of experiment τ .
The evidence of some experiment τ , thus, contains its outcome and its design. Denote
by h = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t the experimentation history after the first t experiments.
Unless stated otherwise, experimentation costs are as follows. Running an informa-
tive experiment τ costs cI , with cI ∈ (0, 12). Running an uninformative experiment τ
with design πτ = (α, (1− α)), with α ∈ [12 , 1], costs cU ∈ (0, cI).
Under public experimentation the sender runs a single experiment and then stops
after either outcome as in KG.11
11The analysis can be extended to sequential public experimentation. By an analogous argument it
can be shown that persuasion is impossible in this extension. The proof is available upon request.
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The experimentation technology under private experimentation is as in FL. The
sender can run as many experiments as desired. He chooses the design of each ex-
periment that he runs and this choice is history dependent. The decision to continue
experimenting or to stop running experiments is also history dependent.
3.3 Messages and verification
Denote the sender’s message by m̂ = στ , where στ is the outcome of some experiment
τ .12 A message m̂ = στ is “feasible”if στ is the outcome of an experiment τ that the
sender ran. The sender may only send a feasible message.
The receiver observes message m̂ = στ . She may verify the message. If the receiver
does not verify m̂, then she exclusively observes m̂ = στ . Verifying m̂ corresponds to
learning the design πτ of experiment τ that yielded the presented outcome στ . If she
verifies m̂ = στ , then she observes the evidence (στ , πτ ).13 The interpretation is that
by learning the design πτ of an experiment τ that yielded an outcome στ she directly
learns the meaning of this outcome. If she does not verify the message, then she can
only deduce (a possibly less accurate) meaning from equilibrium behavior. Verifying
message m̂ costs cv > 0.
3.4 Timing and strategies
The sender moves first. Under public experimentation a pure strategy for the sender
specifies the design of the experiment that he runs. The sender’s message is mechanical
in the sense that it contains the outcome of this experiment. Under private experimen-
tation the sender’s strategy specifies his behavior at each experimentation history h
12Under private experimentation the sender may run more than one experiment. As in FL, the
model could, thus, allow him to reveal more than one outcome. In order to keep the notation simple
the focus here is on messages that contain one outcome. This simplification does not affect the results.
The proof is available upon request.
13Note that the receiver does not learn about other experiments that the sender may have run. If
the message is interpreted as a presented argument, like a paper containing a theoretical model, then
by paying attention, e.g., by carefully reading the paper, the receiver learns the details of the model
that is presented. However, by studying a particular model, she naturally does not learn anything
about other thought experiments that the sender may have conducted and that he did not present.
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that he may observe. At each such history the sender may either continue experiment-
ing with an experiment with a history dependent design, or he may stop experimenting
and send a feasible message.
The receiver moves after observing the sender’s message. At each such message
m̂ = στ the receiver may either not verify m̂ and choose an action a(στ ), or she may
verify m̂ and choose an action a(στ , πτ ). For each message that the receiver may observe
her pure strategy, thus, specifies (i) whether to verify the message, (ii) an action for
each message that she does not verify and (iii) an action for each underlying evidence
of each message that she verifies.
3.5 Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In equilibrium the play-
ers’strategies are sequentially rational. On the equilibrium path beliefs are Bayesian.
If the receiver observes some off-the-equilibrium path evidence (στ , πτ ) (respectively,
message m̂ = στ ), then it is assumed that she only considers experimentation histories
h as possible with (στ , πτ ) ∈ h. Off-the-equilibrium path beliefs have to be such that
the sender cannot signal what he does not know.14
An equilibrium in which the receiver takes the sender’s preferred action a = a1 with
a positive probability on the equilibrium path is called an equilibrium with persuasion.
4 Public experimentation
In the following it is shown that there is no equilibrium with persuasion under public
experimentation if the sender does not face restrictions regarding the design of his exper-
iments. Key for the communication breakdown is that the receiver, once she verifies the
message, observes all the evidence (στ , πτ ) that is available and, therefore, regardless of
14Consider, e.g., public experimentation and suppose the receiver verifies the message. If the sender
runs an off-the-equilibrium path experiment, then this assumption implies that this receiver cannot
have arbitrary beliefs regarding ω, as the sender does not know more about ω. Therefore, this re-
ceiver’s off-the-equilibrium path beliefs regarding ω have to be Bayesian based exclusively on the
experimentation history.
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whether this evidence is on or off-the-equilibrium path, this receiver’s Bayesian update
that the state is ω = ω1 is prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} = πτ (s1|ω1)πτ (s1|ω1)+(1−πτ (s2|ω2)) after
observing a positive outcome and prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s2, πτ )} = 1−πτ (s1|ω1)1−πτ (s1|ω1)+πτ (s2|ω2)
after observing an adverse outcome.
In any potential equilibrium with persuasion there are two commitment problems.
First, the receiver cannot commit to choose against the sender if the observed evidence
is such that her threshold of doubt is just passed. Second, anticipating the receiver’s
commitment problem allows the sender to design any informative experiment with
a relatively low predictive power. The sender cannot commit to run a high quality
experiment that rarely yields a positive outcome. The low predictive power is not
suffi ciently valuable for the receiver to justify the verification costs. Hence, there is no
equilibrium with persuasion in which the receiver verifies messages. In the appendix it
is shown that there is also no equilibrium with persuasion without verification.
Proposition 1 There is no pure and no mixed-strategy equilibrium with persuasion
under public experimentation.
The commitment problems are now analyzed in turn in a potential equilibrium with
persuasion in which the receiver verifies some messages with a positive probability on
the equilibrium path. It is shown that the receiver does not have an incentive to verify
messages, yielding a contradiction.
Consider the receiver’s commitment problem. If she verifies m̂ = s1, then a compar-
ison of the payoffs from each action a shows that it is sequentially rational to choose
a = a1 if and only if
prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} =
πτ (s1 | ω1)
πτ (s1 | ω1) + (1− πτ (s2 | ω2))
≥ pd.
Hence, a receiver who observes evidence (στ = s1, πτ ) cannot commit to choose
against the sender as soon as her threshold of doubt pd is passed. If the receiver verifies
m̂ = s2, then it is optimal to choose a = a2 for each design that the corresponding
12
experiment may have.15 As verification is costly, it follows that it is sequentially rational
for the receiver to choose a = a2 without verification upon observing m̂ = s2. The
receiver may potentially be persuaded in equilibrium upon observing m̂ = s1 (with
and/or without verification), since a positive outcome s1 is more likely if ω = ω1 than
if ω = ω2.
Next, consider the sender’s commitment problem. Anticipating the receiver’s se-
quentially rational behavior, the sender in equilibrium designs any informative experi-
ment τ that he runs with a positive probability such that the probability of a positive
outcome 1
2
πτ (s1 | ω1) + 12(1− πτ (s2 | ω2)) is maximized subject to prob{ω = ω1 | (στ =
s1, πτ )} ≥ pd. The solution to this maximization problem is πτ (s1 | ω1) = 1 and πτ (s2 |
ω2) =
2pd−1
pd
.16 This experimental design implies prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} = pd.
That is, the predictive power of a positive outcome is such that the threshold of doubt
is just passed such that the receiver who verifies a positive outcome from this experi-
ment is just persuaded to choose a = a1. Sequential rationality requires that any other
experiment τ ′ that the sender runs with a positive probability is uninformative, with
prob{ω = ω1 | (στ ′ = s1, πτ ′)} = 12 . The sender cannot commit to run higher quality
experiments.
In order to complete the argument that there is no equilibrium with persuasion as
described above, it is now shown that the receiver’s gross payoff in the hypothetical
equilibrium is the same regardless of whether she verifies a message with a positive
outcome. As verification is costly, the receiver who verifies a message has a profitable
deviation not to verify m̂ = s1.
Figure 1 shows the gross payoff of the receiver as a function of the posterior µ1
that the state is ω = ω1. For all µ1 ∈ [0, pd) it is optimal for the receiver to choose
a = a2. Her gross payoff in this region is µ1pd + (1 − µ1), which is linearly decreasing
15Due to the assumption πτ (s1 | ω1) ≥ 1 − πτ (s2 | ω2), which implies that a positive outcome
is more likely in state ω = ω1 than in state ω = ω2, we have prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s2, πτ )} =
1−πτ (s1|ω1)
1−πτ (s1|ω1)+πτ (s2|ω2) ≤
1−πτ (s1|ω1)
1−πτ (s1|ω1)+1−πτ (s1|ω1) =
1
2 < pd.
16This part of the analysis is analogous to KG. At the optimum we have prob{ω = ω1 | (στ =
s1, πτ )} = πτ (s1|ω1)πτ (s1|ω1)+(1−πτ (s2|ω2)) = pd. Otherwise, the sender could increase the probability of a
positive outcome by increasing πτ (s1 | ω1) or decreasing πτ (s2 | ω2), without violating the constraint.
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in µ1. For all µ1 ∈ [pd, 1] it is optimal for the receiver to choose a = a1. Her gross
payoff in this region is µ1 + (1−µ1)(1− pd), which is linearly increasing in µ1. We have
µ1pd + (1− µ1) = µ1 + (1− µ1)(1− pd) at µ1 = pd.
1
µ1pd 1µ1
µ1pd+1-µ1
Figure 1: Receiver’s gross value function.
Consider a receiver who observes a message m̂ = s1, but does not verify it. A receiver
who does not verify the message does not observe the experiment’s design. From her
perspective a positive outcome may stem from an informative experiment with design
(1, 2pd−1
pd
) or from an uninformative experiment. According to the sender’s commitment
problem the informative experiment τ implies prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} = pd and
the uninformative experiment τ ′ implies prob{ω = ω1 | (στ ′ = s1, πτ ′)} = 12 . Denote
her posterior belief by prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} ≡ µ1. Bayesian plausibility requires
µ1 ∈ [12 , pd] if m̂ = s1. Her payoff is equal to the gross value function evaluated at µ1,
i.e., it is µ1pd + (1− µ1), as illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider next the receiver who verifies a message containing a positive outcome
m̂ = s1. Bayesian plausibility requires that the expected posterior for the receiver who
verifies m̂ = s1 is equal to µ1 before she verifies it. In an equilibrium with persuasion
her Bayesian updates that the state is ω = ω1 are pd if the experimental design is
informative and 1
2
if the experiment is uninformative, with 1
2
< pd. As all combinations
of the posteriors and the corresponding gross payoffs are on the downward sloping
(linear) part of the gross value function this implies that the expected gross utility
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of the receiver who verifies the message m̂ = s1 is equal to the gross value function
evaluated at belief µ1, i.e., it is equal to µ1pd + (1− µ1).
The receiver’s expected gross utility from verifying a message containing a positive
outcome is, thus, equal to her payoff if she does not verify it.17 Since paying attention
is costly, it is better for the receiver not to verify a message with a positive outcome.
Hence, there is no equilibrium with persuasion in which the receiver sometimes verifies
m̂ = s1 on the equilibrium path.
The flexibility that the sender has regarding the design of the experiment’s error
probabilities excludes equilibria with persuasion in which the sender and the receiver
mix. The flexibility allows the sender to make the receiver who verifies the message
indifferent to choose in his favor after a favorable recommendation, which in turn de-
presses the ex ante value of the message too much to justify the costs of verifying it.
The following example shows that cases can be constructed where an equilibrium with
persuasion exists if the degrees of freedom regarding the design of the experiments are
reduced.
Example 1 Suppose the sender may exclusively run an experiment τ
with design πτ = (1, 0) or an experiment τ with design πτ = (1, 1). An
experiment with πτ = (1, 0) yields στ = s1 regardless of the state and an
experiment with πτ = (1, 1) perfectly predicts the state. Let cv ∈ (0, 3pd −
2p2d − 1]. There is an equilibrium with persuasion in mixed strategies with
the following properties: The sender mixes between running an experiment
with design πτ = (1, 0) and an experiment with πτ = (1, 1). The probability
17Key for this point is that a positive outcome of the informative experiment leads to a posterior
equal to pd. As an illustration suppose hypothetically that a positive outcome of the informative
experiment instead yields a posterior µ′1 above pd. In this case the following could occur. We could
still have µ1 < pd, implying that the receiver who does not verify chooses a = a2 and her payoff is
equal to the gross value function (on the downward sloping part) evaluated at µ1. The receiver who
verifies the message, however, obtains a higher ex ante gross payoff. Consider a line between the gross
value function (on the downward sloping part) evaluated at 12 and the gross value function (on the
upward sloping part) evaluated at µ′1 (> pd). The former corresponds to the gross payoff from choosing
a = a2 if the experiment is uninformative and the latter to the gross payoff from choosing a = a1 if it is
informative. The ex ante gross payoff of the receiver who verifies the message is on this line evaluated
at µ1, which clearly is strictly above the payoff of the receiver who does not verify.
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that the sender runs the informative experiment decreases in the verification
costs cv and it approaches one if cv goes to zero. The receiver mixes regarding
verification of a message containing a single positive outcome and chooses
a = a1 if she does not verify the evidence. The verification probability
of a message in the sender’s favor is greater than 1/2. It increases in the
costs of running the informative experiment and it decreases in the costs of
conducting the uninformative experiment. 
In Example 1 the sender has less flexibility. If he runs an informative experiment,
then this experiment mirrors the state of the world. The receiver who observes the
outcome of such an experiment and chooses the corresponding optimal action obtains
a high gross payoff. Before verifying a message in favor of the sender, the receiver
has a benefit from verifying it that has the potential to justify the verification costs.
The equilibrium probability that the message is informative has to be such that the
receiver is indifferent to verify it. The sender on the other hand faces a trade-offbetween
obtaining a positive outcome from the uninformative experiment with certainty that
only persuades the receiver who does not verify the message and obtaining a positive
outcome with probability 1/2 that persuades the receiver regardless of whether she
verifies the message. The receiver’s probability to verify the message has to make the
sender indifferent between running either experiment.
If the design of the sender’s experiment is flexible, then the lack of commitment
power on the receiver’s part is important for the communication breakdown. As an
illustration suppose that the experiment’s design is endogenous again, but that the
receiver can costlessly commit to a rule: accept after verification if and only if the
posterior is above a threshold p. The other assumptions are maintained. It can be
shown that the receiver’s optimal threshold posterior is p = 1. As in Example 1, the
sender mixes between running an uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) and an
experiment with πτ = (1, 1) that perfectly predicts the state, and persuasion occurs in
equilibrium.18
18As in Example 1 verification costs have to be suffi ciently low for such an equilibrium to exist. The
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GK study the robustness of KG’s concavication approach for the derivation of the
sender’s optimal design of the experiment to diverse (experimentation) cost functions.19
They describe a family of cost functions that is compatible with KG’s concavication
approach. For these cost functions the receiver benefits from communication. In the
following it is shown that this result is not robust to endogenous verification, even
if the cost of verification is arbitrarily small but positive. Suppose that an increase
of the experiment’s informativeness according to the Blackwell criterion implies higher
experimentation costs. Uninformative experiments are assumed to be equally expensive
and cheapest.20
Consider a hypothetical equilibrium with persuasion. The sender’s optimal informa-
tive experiment still makes the receiver indifferent between a1 and a2 if she knows that
m̂ = s1 stems from this experiment:21 Suppose the opposite. The sender could deviate
by marginally lowering πτ (s2 | ω2). The receiver’s threshold of doubt upon the observa-
tion of m̂ = s1 is then still passed, if she knows that m̂ = s1 stems from this alternative
experiment. Lowering πτ (s2 | ω2) reduces the experiment’s informativeness according
to the Blackwell criterion and, hence, its costs. The sender in addition benefits, as a
reduction of πτ (s2 | ω2) increases the probability of a positive outcome. The receiver
in the hypothetical equilibrium, thus, has to be indifferent between a = a1 and a = a2
if she verifies m̂ = s1 and observes that it stems from the informative experiment. In
the hypothetical equilibrium the optimal uninformative experiment again has precision
(1, 0), as it is cheapest and yields a positive outcome with certainty.
These are all the ingredients that are required for the communication breakdown.
Consider a receiver who verifies m̂ = s1. If experiment τ is informative, then the
indifference condition implies prob{ω = ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} = pd, i.e., that the threshold
proof is available upon request.
19KG assume costless experimentation, but their results hold if there are (suffi ciently low) constant
experimentation costs for informative experiments. Constant experimentation costs as above can be
viewed as being normalized to zero in KG. It also also does not matter if uninformative experiments are
cheaper than informative experiments: Persuasion has a value for the sender. Persuasion is impossible
in KG with an uninformative experiment, however, it is possible with some informative experiments.
20It is easy to show that cost functions in GK have these properties.
21The design of the optimal informative experiment depends on the curvature of the cost function.
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of doubt is just passed. If experiment τ ′ is uninformative, then we have prob{ω = ω1 |
(στ ′ = s1, πτ ′)} = 12 . There is no equilibrium with persuasion by the same logic as
above.
5 Private experimentation
In contrast to public experimentation the receiver under private experimentation does
not directly observe the outcomes of the experiments that the sender ran. Private ex-
perimentation allows the sender to disclose a subset of the acquired outcomes. The
receiver in general also cannot deduce the number of experiments that the sender ran
upon observing the message, as the sender’s decision to continue experimenting is his-
tory dependent. This renders unraveling à la Milgrom and Roberts (1986) in general
impossible. Due to the power of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs there can be many
equilibria. In the following the properties of equilibria with persuasion are investigated
and the sender-preferred equilibrium is derived. In this section it is again assumed that
running an informative experiment costs cI and running an uninformative experiment
costs cU .
Let ν(m̂) be the equilibrium probability with which message m̂ is verified and let
ρ(m̂) be the equilibrium probability with which the evidence underlying message m̂
is such that the receiver who verifies m̂ chooses a = a1 with a positive probability in
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There is no pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion.
As an illustration consider a hypothetical pure strategy equilibrium in which the
sender runs exclusively one experiment τ on the equilibrium path. Suppose prob{ω =
ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} > pd and suppose the receiver verifies m̂ = s1 in equilibrium, i.e.,
ν(m̂ = s1) = 1. Upon observing evidence (στ = s1, πτ ) the receiver in equilibrium
deduces that the sender ran only experiment τ with a design πτ implying prob{ω =
ω1 | (στ = s1, πτ )} > pd. In this contingency it is sequentially rational to choose
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a = a1, implying ρ(m̂ = s1) = 1. There is no such equilibrium, however. A profitable
deviation for the receiver who verifies message m̂ = s1 is to choose a = a1 without
costly verification of this message. The remaining cases are excluded in the appendix.
Even though there is no pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion, the following
example shows that persuasion can occur in a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Example 2 Let cv ∈ (0, pd(1− pd)). There is an equilibrium with per-
suasion with the following properties: The sender starts experimenting with
an experiment with design πτ = (1, 1). If the outcome of this experiment
is positive, then the sender stops experimenting and sends a message with
this outcome. If the outcome of the first experiment is adverse, then there
is a strictly positive probability smaller than one that the sender runs an
experiment with design πτ = (1, 0). If he runs this experiment, then the
sender sends a message containing the outcome of this experiment. The
receiver mixes regarding verification and may only verify messages with a
positive outcome. The receiver who does not verify such a message chooses
a = a1. The receiver who verifies the message on the equilibrium path
only chooses a = a1 if the outcome stems from an experiment with design
πτ = (1, 1). The probability that the sender runs the uninformative experi-
ment increases in the verification costs cv and it approaches zero if cv goes
to zero. The verification probability of an on the equilibrium path message
in the sender’s favor is greater than 1/2. It decreases in the costs of con-
ducting the uninformative experiment and it does not depend on the costs
an running informative experiment. 
There are some differences between Example 1 and 2. In Example 1 the sender runs
only one experiment, whereas in Example 2 the sender may run one or two experiments.
Under private experimentation there is, in general, no equilibrium where the sender
runs only one experiment on the equilibrium path and mixes between designs πτ =
(1, 1) and πτ = (1, 0) for this experiment. If there were such an equilibrium, then
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the sender has to be indifferent between running either of these experiments, he has
to have an incentive to start experimenting and he must not continue experimenting
after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment. If he has a strict incentive
to start with an experiment with πτ = (1, 1), then this implies via the indifference
condition and the fact that an experiment with πτ = (1, 0) yields a positive outcome
regardless of the state that there is a strict incentive to run the experiment with πτ =
(1, 0) if the outcome of the first experiment is adverse.22 There is, thus, a profitable
deviation to continue experimenting if the outcome of the first experiment is adverse.
In the equilibrium in Example 2 the verification probability has to be such that the
sender is indifferent between stopping experimentation unsuccessfully and running the
uninformative experiment whose outcome can be used to persuade the receiver who
does not verify the message.
There can be other equilibria with persuasion, e.g., equilibria where the sender does
not run an experiment with πτ = (1, 1) on the equilibrium path. In order to show that
outcomes from uninformative experiments are sent in any equilibrium with persuasion,
it is first established that not all messages that are verified are based on evidence that
persuades the receiver who verifies them. That is, we cannot have an equilibrium with
persuasion with ρ(m̂) = 1 for all messages m̂ that the receiver verifies on the equilibrium
path. Suppose the opposite is true, i.e., ρ(m̂) = 1 for all messages m̂ that the receiver
verifies on the equilibrium path. The receiver’s best response implies v(m̂) = 0 for all
such m̂, i.e., not to verify m̂, and choosing a = a1 upon observing each such message.
The sender’s best response to the receiver’s behavior is to run exclusively uninformative
experiments, which contradicts ρ(m̂) = 1 for all messages m̂ that the receiver verifies
on the equilibrium path. Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium with persuasion with ρ(m̂) = 1 for all messages m̂
that the receiver verifies on the equilibrium path.
Lemma 2 implies that there is a positive probability that the evidence underlying
22The sender would then hide the adverse outcome of the first experiment and reveal the positive
outcome of the second experiment.
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some message m̂ that the receiver verifies is such that this receiver is not persuaded
upon observing it. The properties of such evidence, however, are not obvious. Experi-
mentation may serve several purposes. There may be benefits from learning about the
state or benefits from reaching posteriors with more promising continuation payoffs.
Learning and changing the posterior requires informative experiments. The outcomes
of such informative experiments could also be used for persuading the receiver who
does not verify the message, even if they are not suffi ciently informative to persuade
the receiver who verifies it. An equilibrium with persuasion clearly requires that the
sender runs informative experiments. Yet, the following proposition finds that there is
no equilibrium with persuasion, in which the sender exclusively sends messages in his
favor that are based on informative experiments.
Proposition 2 Equilibria with persuasion exist if experimentation and verification costs
are suffi ciently low. In any equilibrium with persuasion, the sender sends messages with
a positive probability on the equilibrium path that contain an outcome from an uninfor-
mative experiment.
An outcome of an uninformative experiment does not relate to the state of the
world and in this sense it does not have an inherent meaning. It is not costless, as it
results from a costly uninformative experiment. The costs of running this uninformative
experiment can also be viewed as information transmission costs or costs of making an
uninformative statement appear informative.
In the following it is argued that a certain equilibrium with persuasion exists. Then
it is established that this equilibrium is sender-preferred. “Sender-preferred”means that
there is no other equilibrium with persuasion in which the sender’s payoff is higher.
Consider an equilibrium in the spirit of Example 2, where the sender (i) starts
experimenting with an informative experiment with precision (1, 1− cI), (ii) stops ex-
perimenting successfully after observing a positive outcome from this experiment and
(iii) runs an uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) with a positive probability
smaller than one after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment. Off-
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the-equilibrium path the sender’s behavior is sequentially rational. In equilibrium the
receiver mixes between verifying a message m̂ = s1 and not verifying it. If she does not
verify this message, then she chooses a = a1. If she verifies it, then she only chooses
a = a1 if the outcome stems from an informative experiment with precision (1, 1− cI)
or (p, 1), with p ∈ (0, 1].23 In all other cases the receiver chooses a = a2. Her belief
upon observing an off-the-equilibrium path precision that is not some precision (p, 1)
is such that it is optimal for her to choose a = a2.24
In order to confirm that this is an equilibrium consider first the sender. An equi-
librium condition is that the sender does not run a further experiment with precision
(1, 1 − cI) after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment and then stops
unsuccessfully. After observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment the sender
knows that the state of the world is ω = ω2. Running a further experiment with preci-
sion (1, 1−cI) yields continuation payoff (1− (1−cI))−cI , as he persuades the receiver
with a positive outcome regardless of whether she verifies this outcome. Therefore, a
necessary condition for equilibrium existence is (1− (1− cI))− cI ≤ 0, which is satisfied
with equality. That is, the precision of the informative experiment is just high enough
to deter him from running a further such experiment upon observing an adverse out-
come from the first experiment. The other equilibrium conditions for the sender are
satisfied analogous to the proof for the existence of the equilibrium in Example 2.
Consider next the receiver. Suppose she observes a message containing a posi-
tive outcome. The probability with which the sender runs the uninformative exper-
iment after observing an adverse outcome of the first experiment determines the re-
ceiver’s value of message m̂ = s1. In equilibrium the receiver has to be indifferent
between choosing a = a1 without verification after observing m̂ = s1 and verifying with
consequent sequentially rational behavior. Let ξ be the probability that the sender
23If the precision is (p, 1), then a positive outcome can only realize in state ω = ω1. I.e., upon
observing a positive outcome from such an experiment the receiver must believe that ω = ω1, in which
case choosing a = a1 is optimal.
24E.g., she may believe that the sender privately ran an additional experiment which perfectly
predicts the state of the world, i.e., with precision (1, 1), that yielded an adverse outcome that is not
revealed.
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runs the uninformative experiment after observing an adverse outcome of the first
experiment. Her utility from choosing a = a1 without verification upon observing
m̂ = s1 is 11+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ + (1 −
1
1+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ )(1 − pd).
25 Her utility from
verifying and consequent sequentially rational behavior is 1
1+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ + (1 −
1
1+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ )((1 − (1 − cI))(1 − pd) + (1 − cI)) − cv.
26 In equilibrium ξ∗ is such
that these two utilities are equal, which corresponds to
ξ∗ =
cv − pdcI + cvcI + pdc2I
pd − pdcI − cv − pdcI + cvcI + pdc2I
.
We have ξ∗ ∈ (0, 1) if cv ∈ (0, 12pd(1− cI)).
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Finally, consider the receiver’s behavior upon observing either message. Upon ob-
serving message m̂ = s2 the receiver at the optimum chooses a = a2 without verification,
as it implies ω = ω2 with certainty. Consider next message m̂ = s1. The receiver who
does not verify the message only chooses a = a1 if her threshold of doubt is passed.
This is the case if prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} ≥ pd, which is equivalent to 1− cvpd(1−cI) ≥ pd
and which holds for all cv ∈ (0, pd (1− pd) (1− cI)).28 The receiver who verifies a mes-
sage containing a positive outcome from the on the equilibrium path experiment then
clearly has a strict incentive to choose a = a1. Off-the-equilibrium path behavior of the
receiver who verifies m̂ = s1 is sequentially rational as described above.
25If ω = ω1, her utility from choosing a = a1 is 1. If ω = ω2, her payoff from choosing a = a1 is
1− pd. We have prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 11+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ , given that the receiver does not verify
m̂ = s1.
26We have prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 11+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ before the receiver verifies m̂ = s1. If the
receiver observes m̂ = s1 and verifies it, then she observes whether it was generated with an experiment
with πτ = (1, 1 − cI) or an experiment with πτ = (1, 0). In state ω = ω1 the informative experiment
always yields a positive outcome, the correct decision a = a1 is made with certainty and the payoff is
1. Consider state ω = ω2. In this case the receiver makes the wrong decision a = a1 yielding payoff
1 − pd if the informative experiment generated a positive outcome s1, which occurs with probability
(1 − (1 − cI)). If the informative experiment generates the adverse outcome s2, which occurs with
probability 1 − cI , then the receiver makes the correct decision a = a2. The reason is that in this
case she observes that the positive outcome in the message stems from the uninformative experiment.
Via equilibrium behavior she deduces that the first experiment must have yielded an adverse outcome,
implying ω = ω2 with certainty. In this case a = a2 is optimal.
27 dξ∗
dcv
> 0 and lim
cv→0
ξ∗ = cI1−cI ∈ (0, 1) (since cI <
1
2 by assumption) and ξ
∗ = 1 if cv = 12pd(1− cI).
28We have prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 11+(1−(1−cI))+(1−cI)ξ∗ , which simplifies to prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ =
s1} = 1− cvpd(1−cI) after plugging in ξ
∗.
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In the following it is shown that the equilibrium, in which πτ (s2 | ω2) = 1 − cI , is
sender-preferred. For this purpose the following two lemmas are useful.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium with persuasion the sender stops experimenting at any
history h where the last experiment in h is the uninformative experiment with precision
πt = (1, 0) and outcome σt = s1.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is that if the sender instead ran a further informative
experiment after running the uninformative experiment, then he could profitably de-
viate by modifying his strategy such that it replicates the persuasion probability at
lower expected experimentation costs. The modification is such that he “reverses the
order”of these experiments in the sense that he first runs the informative experiment
and he runs the uninformative experiment only in case the outcome of the informative
experiment is adverse. If the outcome of the informative experiment is positive instead,
then he can persuade the receiver regardless of whether she verifies m̂ = s1 and he does
not run the costly uninformative experiment in this case.
The next lemma compares the sender’s payoff in any equilibrium with persuasion
from running the uninformative experiment and stopping unsuccessfully at any history.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium with persuasion the sender is indifferent between running
the uninformative experiment with precision πτ = (1, 0) and stopping experimentation
unsuccessfully at any history.
Intuitively, if the sender instead strictly prefers running the uninformative experi-
ment over stopping unsuccessfully, then he would find a positive outcome regardless of
the state of the world. Such an outcome then does not have the power to persuade the
receiver who does not verify a message containing a positive outcome. It also does not
have the power to persuade a receiver who verifies the message. But then running the
costly uninformative experiment is pointless for the sender and he cannot strictly prefer
running it over stopping unsuccessfully. If the sender instead strictly prefers stopping
unsuccessfully over running the uninformative experiment, then he would never run the
latter, which contradicts Proposition 2.
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FL derive the sender-preferred equilibrium in a model where the receiver exoge-
nously always observes the precision of the revealed evidence. They show that in this
equilibrium the sender starts experimenting with an experiment of precision (1, 1− cI)
and stops experimenting after either outcome. If the outcome is positive, then it is
revealed and the receiver is persuaded. If the outcome is adverse, then the sender stops
experimenting unsuccessfully and the receiver is not persuaded. Using Lemmas 3 and
4, it can now be shown that for each equilibrium with persuasion in the current model
there is a corresponding equilibrium in FL that is payoff equivalent for the sender. It
follows that if an equilibrium in the current model yields the same payoff for the sender
as the sender-preferred equilibrium in FL, then it is also sender-preferred here. This is
the case for the above equilibrium where he starts with an experiment with precision
(1, 1 − cI) and where he may only run the uninformative experiment after an adverse
outcome of the first experiment.
According to Lemma 3 the sender always stops experimenting after running the un-
informative experiment. According to Lemma 4 the sender is just indifferent between
running the uninformative experiment and stopping experimentation unsuccessfully in
any equilibrium with persuasion. Consider any equilibrium with persuasion in the cur-
rent model. Modify the sender’s equilibrium strategy as follows such that he does not
run the uninformative experiment at any history. At any history where the sender (i)
mixes exclusively between running the uninformative experiment and stopping unsuc-
cessfully he now stops experimenting unsuccessfully, (ii) runs the uninformative experi-
ment with certainty he now stops experimenting unsuccessfully and (iii) mixes between
running the uninformative experiment and an informative experiment he now runs the
informative experiment. If the receiver’s strategy is not changed, then the modified
sender’s strategy is sequentially rational: At any history where he now stops experi-
menting unsuccessfully instead of running the uninformative experiment (cases (i) and
(ii)), the continuation payoff is the same with the equilibrium strategy and the modified
strategy due to the indifference condition of Lemma 4. At any history where the sender
now runs an informative experiment instead of running the uninformative experiment
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(case (iii)) he receives the same continuation utility, as otherwise mixing with the orig-
inal strategy at such a history is not sequentially rational. Hence, at any other on the
equilibrium path history the same continuation decision is also optimal. The modified
strategy is payoff equivalent to the equilibrium strategy for the sender if the receiver’s
strategy is not changed. If the receiver now exogenously observes the precision of the
experiment of a revealed positive outcome, then it is optimal for her to behave like the
receiver who verifies this outcome. Since the receiver who verifies the positive outcome
is persuaded to choose a = a1 if it stems from the appropriate informative experiment,
a receiver who exogenously observes the outcome also is persuaded to choose a = a1. It
follows that for each equilibrium with persuasion in the current model, there is a payoff
equivalent equilibrium with persuasion in FL for the sender where the sender plays the
modified strategy and the receiver behaves like the receiver who verifies the message.
In particular, for the equilibrium here, where the sender starts with an experiment with
precision (1, 1 − cI) and where he may only run the uninformative experiment after
an adverse outcome of the first experiment, the payoff equivalent equilibrium for the
sender in FL is where he exclusively runs the first experiment with precision (1, 1− cI)
and then stops after either outcome. The reason is that here the sender is indifferent
between running the uninformative experiment and stopping unsuccessfully and the
informative experiment has the same design. Proposition 3 directly follows.
Proposition 3 If experimentation and verification costs are suffi ciently small, then we
have the following in the sender-preferred equilibrium. The sender starts experimenting
with an experiment with precision (1, 1 − cI). If this experiment yields a positive out-
come, then it is revealed to the receiver and the receiver chooses a = a1 regardless of
whether she verifies the message. If the outcome is adverse, then the sender runs an
uninformative experiment with precision (1, 0) with a strictly positive probability smaller
than one and stops experimenting unsuccessfully otherwise. In the former case the re-
ceiver who does not verify the message chooses a = a1 and the receiver who verifies the
message chooses a = a2.
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The sender’s behavior in the sender-preferred equilibrium here is similar to the
sender’s behavior in the corresponding equilibrium in FL. He starts with the same
informative experiment. Instead of stopping after either outcome, though, he here may
run an uninformative experiment in case the first outcome is adverse. Both equilibria
are payoff equivalent for the sender because here it is an equilibrium condition that the
sender is indifferent between stopping unsuccessfully and running the uninformative
experiment. If this were not the case then he would either always present a positive
outcome regardless of the state of the world or he would never run an uninformative
experiment. Both cases are inconsistent with an equilibrium with persuasion in this
game. Due to the indifference condition the sender does not benefit from running the
uninformative experiment. He is as well off as in the case where the receiver always
verifies the sender’s message.
If the receiver exogenously always observes the experiment design of the revealed
outcome, then the sender in the sender-preferred equilibrium only runs an informative
experiment. With endogenous verification on the other hand the sender’s message does
not necessarily have an inherent meaning: There is a chance that a positive outcome
stems from the uninformative experiment. The receiver who does not verify the message
cannot distinguish whether the outcome stems from an informative or uninformative
experiment. The receiver who verifies the message on the other hand can deduce that
the state is ω = ω2 if he observes a positive outcome from an uninformative experiment:
The uninformative experiment is only run if the outcome from the first informative
experiment is adverse and the design of the informative experiment is such that an
adverse outcome perfectly predicts ω = ω2. Overall the receiver who verifies the message
has the same gross utility (i.e., neglecting verification costs) as in the case where she
exogenously observes the revealed outcome’s design. If the receiver does not verify,
then her utility if she observes a positive outcome is equal to this gross utility minus
verification costs due to the receiver’s indifference condition (she only mixes between
verification and no verification if she is indifferent). Saving costs by not verifying is just
offset by making more mistakes due to not observing that the outcome in the message
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may stem from an uninformative experiment.
6 Discussion
Communication is important for achieving economic effi ciency. For example, in the
mechanism design literature it is often assumed that agents can exclusively send cheap
talk messages, which severely limits economic effi ciency (e.g., Myerson and Satterth-
waite, 1983). In practice communication often contains hard components, like logical
arguments or regressions on a public database, and statements that do not have an
inherent meaning.
The focus here is on a receiver who may not pay attention to a sender’s attempt
to persuade her. If the collection of evidence that can be used for persuasion occurs in
private, as with thought experiments or private regressions on a public database, then
communication is possible if running experiments and paying attention is not too costly.
In any equilibrium with persuasion the sender’s message contains an uninformative
element with a positive probability, which dilutes the value of the message that the
sender sends.
The paper highlights the role of the flexibility of the design of the experiments that
the sender may run. Full flexibility leads to a communication breakdown under public
experimentation if the receiver’s verification is both endogenous and costly. The paper
finds that communication and persuasion is possible under public experimentation if
the flexibility is reduced. Under private experimentation an exogenous reduction of the
sender’s flexibility is not necessary. It can be obtained endogenously and, therefore, the
flexibility per se is not an obstacle for persuasion.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a potential equilibrium with persuasion in
which the receiver never verifies any message. Without loss of generality suppose that
the receiver chooses a = a1 after observing m̂ = s1. It is the (unique) best response for
the sender to run an experiment τ with πτ = (1, 0): The sender then obtains a positive
outcome regardless of ω, i.e., it maximizes the persuasion probability, and expected
experimentation costs are at the minimum, given that the sender starts experiment-
ing. As the message containing a positive outcome is uninformative regarding ω, it is
not optimal for the receiver to choose a = a1 upon observing such a message, which
contradicts that she is persuaded. Q.E.D.
Verification of Example 1: The receiver observes the outcome of the experiment
that the sender ran. Let ρ be the probability with which the sender runs the experiment
with design πτ = (1, 1). Let ν be the probability with which the receiver verifies the
message containing outcome s1.
Step (1) analyzes the receiver’s behavior. Step (2) analyzes the sender’s behavior.
(1) Receiver behavior:
If the receiver observes a message with outcome s1 and verifies it, then she observes
whether the sender generated it with an experiment with πτ = (1, 1) or an experiment
with πτ = (1, 0). In the former case her optimal choice is a = a1 yielding utility 1 and
in the latter case her posterior equals her prior belief and the optimal choice is a = a2
yielding expected utility 1
2
pd +
1
2
. Given that the receiver observes s1, the probability
that the underlying experiment is informative is ρ
ρ+2(1−ρ) =
ρ
2−ρ . Her expected utility
from verifying the message is, thus, ρ
2−ρ + (1−
ρ
2−ρ)(
1
2
pd +
1
2
)− cv.
If the receiver observes a message with outcome s1 and does not verify it, then she
chooses a = a1. The probability that the underlying experiment is informative is
ρ
2−ρ .
In this case she obtains utility 1 from a = a1. If the experiment is uninformative, then
she obtains utility (1
2
+ 1
2
(1− pd)) from a = a1. The receiver’s expected utility from not
verifying the message and choosing a = a1 is, therefore,
ρ
2−ρ + (1−
ρ
2−ρ)(
1
2
+ 1
2
(1− pd)).
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The receiver is indifferent between verifying and not verifying upon observing a
message with outcome s1 if
ρ
2− ρ + (1−
ρ
2− ρ)(
1
2
+
1
2
(1− pd)) =
ρ
2− ρ + (1−
ρ
2− ρ)(
1
2
pd +
1
2
)− cv,
which is equivalent to ρ = 2cv−2pd+1
cv−2pd+1 . We have ρ ∈ (0, 1) if cv ∈ (0, pd −
1
2
).
It remains to show that a = a1 is indeed optimal for the receiver if she does not
verify the message with outcome s1. This choice is optimal if prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ =
s1} = 12−ρ ≥ pd. As the equilibrium ρ decreases in cv, with limcv→0ρ = 1, there are cv > 0
suffi ciently low such that prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 12−ρ ≥ pd is satisfied. The condition
is satisfied if cv ∈ (0, 3pd − 2p2d − 1].
As 3pd − 2p2d − 1 < pd − 12 for all pd ∈ (
1
2
, 1), equilibrium existence requires cv ∈
(0, 3pd − 2p2d − 1].
(2) Sender behavior:
It has to be shown that (i) the sender is indifferent between running either ex-
periment and that (ii) the sender’s benefit from running an experiment with either
πτ = (1, 1) or πτ = (1, 0) is at least 0.
(i) If the sender runs the experiment with πτ = (1, 1), then s1 realizes with proba-
bility 1
2
and s1 induces a = a1 regardless of whether the receiver verifies the message,
yielding expected utility 1
2
− cI .
If the sender runs the experiment with πτ = (1, 0), then outcome s1 realizes with
probability 1, but it only induces a = a1 if the receiver does not verify the message,
i.e., with probability 1− v, yielding expected utility 1− ν − cU .
The sender is indifferent between running either an experiment with πτ = (1, 0) or
an experiment with πτ = (1, 1) if
1− ν − cU =
1
2
− cI .
Solving this equation for ν yields ν = 1
2
− cU + cI , which is in the interval (12 , 1)
since cU ∈ (0, cI) and cI ∈ (0, 12).
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(ii) The sender’s expected utility if he runs the experiment with πτ = (1, 1) is 12−cI ,
as derived in (i). He is better off to run this experiment than not to run any experiment
if
1
2
− cI ≥ 0,
which is satisfied, as cI ∈ (0, 12) by assumption.
Due to the indifference condition in (i) the sender is also better off to run an exper-
iment with πτ = (1, 0) than not to run any experiment. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Denote by m̂∗ a message that is sent with a positive probability
on the equilibrium path and that induces the receiver who does not verify it to choose
a = a1 with a positive probability. Message m̂∗ can be interpreted as a recommendation
to choose the sender’s preferred action. Let M̂∗ be the set of all messages m̂∗.
Consider a potential pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion where M̂∗ is not
empty. First, it is shown that there is no such equilibrium with v(m̂∗) = 0 for all
m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗. It follows that in any such potential pure strategy equilibrium we have
v(m̂∗) = 1 and ρ(m̂∗) = 0 for some m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗ and / or we have v(m̂∗) = 1 and
ρ(m̂∗) = 1 for some m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗. These cases are excluded next.
There is no equilibrium with v(m̂∗) = 0 for all m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗: Suppose the opposite.
The sender’s best response is to run an experiment τ with πτ = (1, 0) if m̂∗ = s1
(respectively, an experiment τ with πτ = (0, 1) if m̂∗ = s2), since cU < cI and prob{στ =
s1 | πτ = (1, 0)} (respectively, prob{στ = s2 | πτ = (0, 1)}) is greater than if outcome
s1 (respectively, s2) was generated with an experiment that is informative regarding
ω.29 The receiver deduces that the message is uninformative and it is optimal for her
to choose a = a2, i.e., she is not persuaded.
There is no equilibrium with v(m̂∗) = 1 and ρ(m̂∗) = 0 for some m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗: The
receiver’s best response to ρ(m̂∗) = 0, i.e., the evidence underlying m̂∗ being always
uninformative, is to choose a = a2 upon observing m̂∗ without verifying it.
There is no equilibrium with v(m̂∗) = 1 and ρ(m̂∗) = 1 for some m̂∗ ∈ M̂∗: The
29Running an uninformative experiment with πτ = ( 12 ,
1
2 ) is weakly worse for the sender than to run
an uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) (respectively, πτ = (0, 1)).
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receiver’s best response to ρ(m̂∗) = 1, i.e., the evidence underlying m̂∗ being always
persuasive for a receiver who verifies the message, is to choose a = a1 upon observing
m̂∗ without verifying it.
Finally, consider a potential pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion where M̂∗ is
empty, i.e., where the receiver who does not verify messages chooses a = a2. In such
an equilibrium only the receiver who verifies the message may choose a = a1. Consider
a message that this receiver verifies. We cannot have that the underlying evidence of
this message is always persuasive, as in this case the receiver who verifies the message
has a profitable deviation not to verify it and to choose a = a1 saving the verification
costs. Analogously, we cannot have that the underlying evidence of such a message is
always not persuasive. Hence, there is no such pure strategy equilibrium. We also do
not have a pure strategy equilibrium with persuasion where the receiver never verifies
any message and always chooses a = a2. Q.E.D.
Verification of Example 2: Step (1) introduces beliefs that support the equi-
librium behavior. Step (2) analyzes the receiver’s on the equilibrium path behavior.
Step (3) analyzes the sender’s on the equilibrium path behavior. Denote by ξ the prob-
ability that the sender runs an experiment with design πτ = (1, 0) if he observes an
adverse outcome s2 of the first experiment (which has design πτ = (1, 1)). Let ν be the
probability with which the receiver verifies a message that contains outcome s1.
(1) On the equilibrium path beliefs are formed in accordance with Bayes’law. Off-
the-equilibrium path beliefs can be specified that support the equilibrium behavior. An
off-the-equilibrium path event is where the receiver who verifies a message observes an
off-the-equilibrium path design. Consider a message containing a positive outcome.
If the design of the corresponding experiment is not (p, 1), with p ∈ (0, 1), then the
receiver who verifies the message forms a probability assessment over experimentation
histories such that the probability that ω = ω1 conditional on this assessment is below
the threshold of doubt. E.g., she may believe that the sender privately ran a single
additional experiment with design (1, 1) that yielded an adverse outcome. Given these
beliefs the receiver’s best response is to choose a = a2. The sender, thus, does not
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benefit from sending a message containing an outcome stemming from an experiment
with such an off-the-equilibrium path design.
If the off-the-equilibrium path design is (p, 1), with p ∈ (0, 1), then beliefs upon
observing a positive outcome are such that the receiver who verifies the message thinks
that ω = ω1, which induces action a = a1.30 The probability that at least one posi-
tive outcome realizes from running any number of such experiments is lower than from
running a single experiment with design (1, 1). The sender also cannot learn more
about the state from running any sequence of experiments compared to a single ex-
periment with design (1, 1). Therefore, the sender does not benefit from running such
off-the-equilibrium path experiments. Due to these off-the-equilibrium path beliefs,
only experiments with design (1, 1) and (1, 0) may be run on the equilibrium path.
(2) If the receiver observes m̂ = s1 and verifies it, then she observes whether it was
generated with an experiment with πτ = (1, 1) or an experiment with πτ = (1, 0). In
the former case she knows that ω = ω1 and her optimal choice is a = a1 yielding utility
1. In the latter case she deduces that the first experiment with design (1, 1) yielded an
adverse outcome s2, implying ω = ω2. Her optimal choice in this case is a = a2 yielding
expected utility 1. Conditional on observing m̂ = s1, the probability that this message
was generated with an experiment with design πτ = (1, 1) is 11+ξ . Her expected utility
from verifying the message is, thus, 1
1+ξ
+ (1− 1
1+ξ
)− cv = 1− cv.
If the receiver observes m̂ = s1 and does not verify it, then she chooses a = a1
according to the postulated equilibrium. If ω = ω1, her utility from choosing a = a1 is
1. If ω = ω2, her payoff from choosing a = a1 is 1 − pd. We have prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ =
s1} = 11+ξ , given that the receiver does not verify m̂ = s1. The receiver’s expected utility
from not verifying m̂ = s1 and choosing a = a1 is, therefore, 11+ξ + (1−
1
1+ξ
)(1− pd).
The receiver is indifferent between verifying and not verifying message m̂ = s1 if
1
1 + ξ
+ (1− 1
1 + ξ
)(1− pd) = 1− cv,
30If an experiment with design (p, 1) yields a positive outcome, then it implies ω = ω1.
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which is equivalent to ξ = cv
pd−cv . We have ξ ∈ (0, 1) if cv ∈ (0,
1
2
pd).
It remains to show that a = a1 is indeed optimal for the receiver if she does not
verify message m̂ = s1. This choice is optimal if prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 11+ξ ≥ pd.
As the equilibrium ξ increases in cv, with lim
cv→0
ξ = 0, there are cv > 0 suffi ciently low
such that prob{ω = ω1 | m̂ = s1} = 11+ξ ≥ pd is satisfied. The inequality holds if
cv ≤ pd − p2d.
As pd−p2d < 12pd for all pd ∈ (
1
2
, 1), equilibrium existence requires cv ∈ (0, pd(1−pd)).
(3) Consider the sender’s message. If the sender stops experimenting and the stock of
collected experimental outcomes contains an outcome that induces a1 if the appropriate
message is sent, then he sends such a message as a1 is the preferred action. If the sender
stops experimenting unsuccessfully, then he induces action a2 with any feasible message.
Therefore, sending any feasible message is optimal after unsuccessful experimentation.
The sender in equilibrium may exclusively run experiments with πτ = (1, 1) and
πτ = (1, 0). On the equilibrium path the sender’s first experiment has design πτ =
(1, 1). If this experiment yields outcome s1, then he stops experimenting and reveals
m̂ = s1 containing the outcome of the first experiment. If the first experiment yields
outcome s2, then he runs a second experiment with design πτ = (1, 0) with a probability
ξ ∈ (0, 1). Then he stops experimenting. It has to be shown that (i) the sender starts
experimenting with design πτ = (1, 1) and (ii) the sender after observing outcome s2 of
an experiment with design πτ = (1, 1) is indifferent to run an experiment with design
πτ = (1, 0) (versus no further experiment) and does not want to run an experiment
with πτ = (1, 1).
(i) Anticipating his and the receiver’s following behavior, the sender’s gross payoff
from running the first experiment with πτ = (1, 1) is 12 +
1
2
ξ(1 − ν). Experimenting
according to the equilibrium is better than not experimenting if
1
2
+
1
2
ξ(1− ν)− cI −
1
2
ξcu ≥ 0. (1)
The best deviation, given that the sender starts experimenting, is to run the first
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experiment with πτ = (1, 0), which yields utility (1 − ν) − cU .31 This deviation is not
profitable, if
1
2
+
1
2
ξ(1− ν)− cI −
1
2
ξcU ≥ 1− ν − cU . (2)
(ii) Outcome s2 of the first experiment implies ω = ω2. After observing outcome s2
and knowing that ω = ω2, the sender does not run a further costly experiment with
πτ = (1, 1) as the probability to obtain an outcome s1 from such an experiment is zero.
After observing outcome s2 of the first experiment, the sender is indifferent between
not running a further experiment and to run an experiment with πτ = (1, 0) if
(1− ν)− cU = 0
which is equivalent to
ν = 1− cU .
Inequalities (1) and (2) are both equivalent to 1
2
−cI ≥ 0 if v = 1−cU . For cI ∈ (0, 12)
the inequality is satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Existence follows from the discussion in the text.
Consider a potential equilibrium with persuasion in which the sender on the equilib-
rium path exclusively runs informative experiments. Denote some evidence that induces
the receiver who verifies the message to choose a = a2 with certainty in equilibrium
by m2. Due to Lemma 2 in any equilibrium with persuasion the sender sends some
message m̂ that the receiver verifies on the equilibrium path, where m̂ is based on some
evidence m2 with a positive probability. Consider a hypothetical on the equilibrium
path experimentation history ht where the last experimental outcome completes some
m2. The sender may stop experimenting at ht and send a message with some underly-
ing evidence m2 or the sender may continue experimenting at ht.32 Consider the last
31With such an experiment he can only persuade the receiver who does not verify the message. This
occurs with probability (1− ν). The costs of running the experiment are cU , regardless of whether the
receiver verifies the evidence.
32E.g., he may try to find some underlying evidence inducing a = a1 with some probability. Revealing
m2 could then be the outside option that potentially persuades the receiver who does not verify the
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experiment t in ht. This experiment has design πt = (p, q). Suppose that the sender
only lacks one outcome s1 in order to complete m2 before running experiment t. The
argument if he lacks one outcome s2 is analogous. Let µ1 be the posterior belief that
the state is ω = ω1 at history ht−1. Denote by u1 the sender’s continuation payoff if
experiment t yields outcome s1. Similarly, denote by u2 the continuation payoff if this
experiment yields outcome s2.
In the following a deviation is constructed, where the sender mixes between two
experiments at t, that makes the sender better off. With this deviation, the (expected)
continuation payoffs after either outcome of experiment t are the same as without
the deviation. The probability that either outcome realizes is also the same with the
deviation as without. However, expected experimentation costs at t are lower with
mixing than without the deviation, rendering the deviation profitable.
Suppose the sender mixes at t. With probability α > 0 he runs an experiment with
πt = (1, 0) and with probability (1−α) he runs an experiment with πt = (p−ε1, q+ε2),
with εj > 0, j = 1, 2. An experiment with πt = (1, 0) always yields outcome s1 and
is uninformative regarding ω. Parameters ε1 and ε2 are now chosen such that (i)
the posterior belief prob{ω = ω1 | µ1, (σt = s2, πt)} if the experiment with design
πt = (p − ε1, q + ε2) is run is the same as in case the experiment with design πt =
(p, q) is conducted and (ii) outcome s1 is less likely with the experiment with design
πt = (p − ε1, q + ε2) than with the experiment with design πt = (p, q). By definition
we have prob{ω = ω1 | µ1, (σt = s2, πt)} =
µ1(1−p)
µ1(1−p)+(1−µ1)q
if experiment t has design
πt = (p, q). Consider a small decrease of p, i.e., ε1 is small and positive. The posterior
prob{ω = ω1 | µ1, (σt = s2, πt)} with this modification can only stay constant if q
increases suffi ciently, i.e., ε2 is positive. For a suffi ciently small and positive ε1, there
is, thus, a ε2(ε1) > 0 such that prob{ω = ω1 | µ1, (σt = s2, πt)} is constant. Parameters
εj > 0, j = 1, 2, ensures that (ii) is satisfied. As the posterior at outcome s2 of
experiment t is the same with the deviation and without, the continuation payoffs in
both cases are equal to u2. Next set α = α(ε1) such that the probability that s1 realizes
message in case the search for evidence inducing a = a1 is not successful.
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with the deviation is the same as with the hypothetical equilibrium. With this α, ε1
and ε2, the probability that sj realizes is the same with and without the deviation for
each j = 1, 2. This implies that the expected posterior (from ht−1’s perspective) if s1
realizes is the same with and without the deviation.33 Now suppose that the sender
in the deviation continues after outcome s1 (regardless of the design of experiment t)
as if this outcome were generated by an experiment with design (p, q).34 The expected
continuation payoff if the outcome of experiment t in the deviation is s1 is, thus, u1 as
without the deviation.
Each outcome sj, j = 1, 2, by construction realizes with the same probability with
and without the deviation. The expected continuation payoffs after each outcome
sj are the same with and without the deviation. The deviation is profitable, as an
experiment with design πt = (1, 0) costs cU which by assumption is lower than running
an informative experiment at costs cI . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: At h the sender does not run exclusively further costly
uninformative experiments with precision (1, 0), since he already has a positive outcome
from such an experiment and he can only send a message containing one outcome.
Suppose that the sender in a hypothetical equilibrium runs a further informative
experiment τ with certainty after h, that he persuades the receiver with a message
containing a positive outcome from this informative experiment (regardless of whether
she verifies the outcome) and that the sender stops experimenting if the outcome of
this informative experiment is adverse in which case he sends a message containing the
outcome from the uninformative experiment. Furthermore, suppose that the uninfor-
33Note that with the deviation, the actual posterior after outcome s1 depends on whether experiment
t has design (p − ε1, q + ε2) or design (1, 0). By construction the expected posterior, however, is as
without the deviation.
34To illustrate consider the following three histories that have the same subhistory ht−1 =
{(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t−1: (1) History ht = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t−1,t, where the last outcome in ht is s1
stemming from an experiment with design (p, q). (2) History h′t = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t−1,t, where
the last outcome in ht is s1 stemming from an experiment with design (1, 0). (3) History h′′t =
{(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t−1,t, where the last outcome in ht is s1 stemming from an experiment with design
(p− ε1, q + ε2).
The statement means that the continuation decision at any history hz = {(στ , πτ )}τ=1,...,t−1,t,...,z
that has subhistory h′t or h
′′
t is set equal to the continuation decision at a history that equals hz with
the exception that experiment t has design (p, q).
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mative experiment t in h is run with certainty after the sender observes the outcome
of experiment t − 1 in h. Modify the sender’s strategy is follows. After observing the
outcome of experiment t − 1 in h the sender runs the informative experiment τ with
certainty. If the outcome of this experiment is positive, then he stops experimenting
and sends a message containing this outcome. If the outcome of this experiment is ad-
verse, then he runs the uninformative experiment with precision (1, 0), after which he
stops experimenting and where sends a message containing the positive outcome from
the uninformative experiment. Consider the sender’s expected payoff after observing
the outcome from experiment t−1 in h from the hypothetical equilibrium strategy and
the modified strategy. The persuasion probability is the same. However, the expected
experimentation costs are lower with the modified strategy, as the informative experi-
ment is run with the same probability, but the uninformative experiment is run with a
lower probability with the modified strategy. Hence, there is no such equilibrium.
In other potential equilibria where the sender does not stop after running the un-
informative experiment it is possible to replicate the persuasion probability at lower
expected costs at the history before the uninformative experiment is run by construct-
ing an analogous modified strategy. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: According to Lemma 3 the sender anticipates that it is sequen-
tially rational to stop experimenting after having run the uninformative experiment. He
can only potentially persuade the receiver who does not verify a message with a positive
outcome from the uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0). The sender’s benefit from
running the uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) is independent of the state of
the world, as it yields a positive outcome regardless of the state, and, hence, his benefit
is independent of the experimentation history.
Suppose there is a history where the sender strictly prefers running the uninfor-
mative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) (anticipating stopping afterwards) over stopping
unsuccessfully. In this case the sender strictly prefers running the uninformative ex-
periment (anticipating stopping afterwards) over stopping unsuccessfully at any ex-
perimentation history. Hence, the sender never stops experimenting without finding a
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positive outcome. In such an equilibrium the receiver who does not verify the message
knows that she observes a positive outcome regardless of the state of the world. Hence,
the positive outcome is uninformative and it is a best response to choose a = a2 upon
observing it. In such an equilibrium the sender cannot persuade the receiver with an
outcome from the uninformative experiment regardless of whether the receiver verifies
the message or not. As the uninformative experiment is costly, the sender prefers not
running it over running it, yielding a contradiction.
Suppose there is a history where the sender strictly prefers stopping experimenting
unsuccessfully over running the uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) (anticipating
stopping afterwards). In this case the sender strictly prefers stopping experimentation
over running the uninformative experiment at any experimentation history. Conse-
quently, he never runs the uninformative experiment, contradicting Proposition 2.
As the sender runs the uninformative experiment with πτ = (1, 0) with a positive
probability according to Proposition 2, it follows that he must be indifferent between
running this experiment and stopping experimentation unsuccessfully. Q.E.D.
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